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FROM : Amembassy, MOSCOW

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

February 16, 1962

REF :

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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 7INDEXEXTERNAL - POLITICAL

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MILITARY (ARMY)

Army Units Hold Winter Exercises

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet Foreign Relations. Disarmament, supplanted colonialism as the main foreign affairs topic in Moscow during the week. The space allotted in Soviet newspapers to Puenta del Este and the alleged US set-back in Latin America last week was abruptly transferred to comment on disarmament and the forthcoming Geneva meeting once Khrushchev's February reply to the Kennedy-Macmillan February 7 letter had been dispatched. Meanwhile, Berlin-Germany developments received little press attention and the main point made on this score was that the US position, as reflected in the course of the Thompson-Gromyko talks, showed a general tendency toward hardness, intractability, and pursuit of cold-war goals on the part of the US Administration. Writing for Izvestiya, Polyanov, who has been acting as the sole Soviet press commentator on the Thompson-Gromyko talks, said that the US is employing new tactics, but evidently has the same goals and that this bodes ill not only for a settlement on Berlin and Germany, but also for practically the entire range of East-West issues around the globe.

The release of the U-2 flyer Powers was reported in the most inconspicuous way in Pravda on February 11, and was described as a gesture to relax tension. No details were given about Powers' release and nothing was said about the exchange of Soviet-agent Abel or the release of Pryor from East Germany.

An occasion to gauge the state of Soviet-Chinese relations was provided by ceremonies observing the 12th anniversary of the Soviet-Chinese Alliance. Press treatment of this event suggested serious deterioration -- even compared with 1961.

2. Disarmament. The Kennedy-Macmillan proposal, advanced in a joint message to Khrushchev on February 7, that the 18-nation Disarmament Conference open on the foreign minister level was countered by Khrushchev on February 10 with the suggestion that heads of government participate in the opening phase of the negotiations. Messages setting forth this proposal were not only addressed to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan but to the other heads of government whose countries are represented on the 18-nation committee. Accompanying the publication of this initial exchange of messages on February 13, the Soviet press launched a propaganda broadside representing the Khrushchev proposal as another inspired initiative designed to contribute to the resolution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, Soviet editorial comment asserted that Khrushchev's initiative was encountering resistance in some Western quarters, especially the US where monopolists and their representatives in government were exerting their pernicious influence. Soviet journalists also contended that the outlook for progress at the 18-nation conference was dim so long as the West continued to increase its military budgets, step up the strength of its armed forces, conduct nuclear weapons tests, and adhere to old concepts of arms control.

While emphasizing the negative reaction in the West, the Soviet press conveyed the impression that the Khrushchev proposal was being warmly received and approved in most other parts of the world. It was apparent that the Soviets were awaiting with keen interest the reaction of such neutral leaders

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as Nehru and Nasser. It appears that the Soviets are keeping the question of Khrushchev's participation in the opening phase of the conference open until responses from neutral leaders are received.

The tenor and substance of the present Soviet press campaign seems to indicate that the immediate aim of the Soviets is create pressure on the US not to resume atmospheric nuclear tests.

3. Soviet-Chinese Relations. Observance of the 12th anniversary of the 1950 Soviet-Chinese Alliance, as reflected in Soviet press treatment, revealed marked downgrading compared with last year. This was especially apparent from the absence of the Chinese Communist Ambassador from Moscow at the time, the relatively low-level of Soviet officials attending the ceremonies, the politely phrased but frosty remarks exchanged in official speeches, and the small volume of press coverage. The main theme of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires seemed to be that the alliance is of equal value to Communist China and the USSR and that bloc unity is imperative. On the other hand, Soviet spokesmen spoke of the value of the alliance in protecting China from "imperialist" encroachment, made pointed references to Soviet economic and technical aid to China, and, while professing devotion to solidarity with China, certainly did not treat it as something that the Soviet Union can not live without.

4. Berlin/Germany.

Despite the buildup of Soviet pressure in the air corridors, Soviet information media have maintained an absolute silence on this subject.

This reaction was in line with the continuing general low key treatment of the Berlin issue in the Soviet press. Only one article during the week complained of "provocations" in West Berlin. Red Star Feb. 14 attacked Bundestag Committee meetings, illegal use of the air corridors "made available to the Western Powers exclusively for flying supplies and maintaining their garrisons," and President Luebke's activities in West Berlin.

The monthly International Affairs, however, published a "commentator," article which seemed designed to prove that West Berlin is withering away. The editorial used much of the same argumentation employed by Izvestiya in the three Polyanov commentaries published to date on the discussions between Ambassador Thompson and Gromyko, concentrating the attack on US desire to preserve "the occupation regime" and the US proposal for an international autobahn authority.

5. Southeast Asia. The Soviet Government published a Declaration on West Irian on February 9. This document did not seem to go beyond previous Soviet official and propaganda expressions of support for the Indonesian claim and throws little light on the Soviet attitude on current Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. Although it warned gravely that a little spark can start a big fire, there was no specific threat of Soviet military support for Indonesia in the event that military operations should break out. It is likely that the main motives for publishing the document were to lay the basis

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for claiming credit -- under the new correlations of forces thesis -- for possible Indonesian acquisition of West Irian and to prove the efficacy of the Soviet-sponsored UN Declaration on Colonialism.

Laos and Vietnam continued to receive only minimal attention in the Soviet press, reflecting Soviet concern that the complex and difficult-to-control situation in those areas might get out of hand.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

6. Leadership: The Well-Oiled Apparatus. The Soviet regime ground along much as usual during the week, turning out a respectable quota of documents bearing on the international and domestic issues currently on the agenda. Yet it appeared that only a few of the ruling hierarchy -- the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee -- were at their stations in Moscow. Or if they were, they were taking care not to appear in places where their presence could be verified by foreigners. (Embassy's telegram No. 2202, February 14).

While W. M. MOLOTOV strolled in the Kremlin park last week-end, under the eye of the Canadian Ambassador, his former colleagues and current critics were hard to locate. L. I. BREZHNEV, titular Head of State, did not receive the credentials of the Ambassador of the Somali Republic on February 13. Indeed, Brezhnev's whereabouts have not been reported in the Soviet press since December 31, 1961. N. S. KHRUSHCHEV has been visible to the world at large only on five days since then: January 10-12, at Minsk; January 26 at Kiev, and February 7 at Sochi. F. R. KOZLOV, "Second Secretary" of the Central Committee, put in an appearance at the opening session of the Kremlin social-science conference on January 30. M. A. SUSLOV, who failed to attend the Kremlin New Year's Eve reception, thus giving rise to rumors that he had had a "recurrence of tuberculosis" or, alternatively, was in Peking talking to the Chinese Communists, has been identified on six days: January 6, January 30-February 2, and February 10. A. I. MIKOYAN has dropped out of sight since returning from his African trip January 4-23. G. I. VORONOV, the rising young Russian Republic Party boss, was in Voronezh January 6-7 and in Rostov January 11-12, with his side-kick D. S. POLYANSKIY, the Russian Republic Premier 9 (the two had been the only top leaders to attend the Cuban national-day reception on January 2). Voronov popped up again only on February 13 to attend a Moscow meeting commemorating the 12th anniversary of the Soviet-Chinese friendship treaty. And those two old stalwarts, N. M. SHVERNIK and O. V. KUUSINEN, were nowhere to be seen during this period. Only A. N. KOSYGIN -- like Mikoyan a First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers -- appeared to have been minding the store in Moscow consistently since New Year's.

Khrushchev had told Brazilian Charge d'Affairs Roberto ASSUMPCAO de Araujo, at Sochi on February 7, that Mikoyan was in the neighborhood and that he expected to see K. Ye VOROSHILOV there soon.

Moscow observers were wondering what was going on. Was this prolonged absence of so many of the USSR's ruling few from their accustomed haunts merely evidence that they were taking well-earned winter vacations after the

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rigors of the XXII Congress and the mopping-up that followed it? Or were they perhaps caucusing and conferring in preparation for the Central Committee plenum set for March 5?

Whatever the case, there was no let or halt in the flow of messages of all sorts, on matters big and small, signed in the usual style with the names of Khrushchev or Khrushchev and Brezhnev. If the absence of most of the leadership from Moscow, or at least from the public eye, meant anything, it certainly did not mean any diminution in the Kremlin's always awesome production of pieces of paper.

7. Leadership: Khrushchev Receives Thirty Percent of Supreme Soviet Nominations. A final tabulation of the Supreme Soviet nominations, as reported in the Soviet press February 1-11, shows that N. S. Khrushchev received a seigniorial 30 percent of the total number of nominations received by Presidium members. This compares with the approximately one-third of the total nominations that he received four years ago.

With nominations of candidates for 784 seats in the Soviet of the Union and 645 in the Soviet of Nationalities completed, the election has moved into the registration phase. Election committees of the various constituencies are now registering candidates for both chambers. Of the two or three previously nominated in each district, one will be chosen as a candidate by the district election committee. Members and candidate-members of the Presidium have announced the district from which each will stand.

At the end of the nomination period, on February 11, the Central Committee of the CPSU published an "appeal" to the voters emphasizing the economic and agricultural successes allegedly scored by the regime in the four years since the last elections. The object in this, as in past Soviet elections, is to have as high a percentage of the population as possible endorse the single bloc of candidates.

An early tally of nominations was reported in WEEKA No. 6 (Feb. 9). The final count is:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Number of Election Districts in which Name Put Forward</u>
I. KHRUSHCHEV	213
II. BREZHNEV	88
III. KOZLOV	79
IV. SUSLOV	70
V. MIKOYAN	57
VI. KOSYGIN	50

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VII.	PODGORNY	38
	KUUSINEN	37
	SHVERNIK	37
VIII.	VORONOV	26
IX.	POLYANSKIY	19

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It will be seen from a comparison of these figures with those in WEEKA No. 6 that the pattern remained essentially uniform except for the rise of Suslov and of Mikoyan over Kosygin. It is not clear whether Suslov and Mikoyan's late show of strength was the result of previous planning, new developments affecting their status within the Party, or the normal workings of the Soviet press. Many of the nominations that boosted their scores were gleaned from the republic-capital press in the later stages of the campaign.

Along with the names of workers, peasants, and simple "non-Party" folk, whose nominations were reported with those of the Party notables, there was a sprinkling of otherwise well-known names among the candidates. Some of these were those of astronauts GAGARIN and TITOV, Izvestiya editor ADZHUBEY, Marshals MALINOVSKIY and TIMOSHENKO; Admiral GORSHKOV; several of the more favored writers and "people's artists"; and several republic chairmen of the KGB.

Of the members and candidate-members removed from the Presidium at the XXII Congress, the only ones whose nominations to the Supreme Soviet have come to light in the press are KOROTCHENKO and KALNBERZIN. The names of ARISTOV, FURTSEVA, N. G. IGNATOV, KIRILENKO, MUKHITDINOV, PERVUKHIN, and POSPELOV have been missing from the published lists of nominees. Not all the names of nominees have been published, however, and it is not impossible that one or more of these persons may still be elected to the Supreme Soviet.

8. Vilnius Show Trial Culminates in Four Death Sentences. The Lithuanian press reported on February 11 the conviction of eight currency speculators, of whom all were apparently Jews. (Embassy's despatch No. 728, February 13). Embassy officers who were in Vilnius during the trial heard that it was the biggest public event in the city and that it was being held in the Dzerzhinsky Club because the normal court chamber was not big enough to hold the crowds. Although TASS reported, on February 10, that this was an "open" trial, the Embassy officers, when they attempted to visit the proceedings, were stopped at the chamber door by a uniformed guard and prevented from entering because they had no passes.

Press reports of the trial contained no overtly anti-Semitic overtones, as had been the case with press reports of previous similar trials (Embassy's despatch No. 637, January 19, 1962). Local coverage of the trial was characterized, though, by a spiteful humor. Fyodor KAMINER, later sentenced to death, was called "The Chameleon" because of his ready repentance and colorful confession, in the course of which he was said to have spoken contemptuously of co-defendant MELAMED as a small-timer who "doesn't even know how many thousands there are in a million."

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Sentenced to be shot, besides Kaminer, were: Mikhail RABINOVICH and Aaron and Basya REZNITSKY, husband and wife. Maxim MELAMED, Raphael VIDRI, Zelda ZISMANOVICH, and Mikhail KALINYAR were sentenced to "deprivation of freedom" for terms of ten, eight, six, and four years, respectively. The sentences are not subject to appeal.

MILITARY (ARMY)

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Boris H. Klosson

Boris H. Klosson
Counselor for Political Affairs.

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